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1. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Appellant/plaintiff David Bennett seeks a day in court on claims before a Utah 
judge and jury. 
The defendant/appellees Michael L. Kirby, A.P.C. and individually, and his law 
firm Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat (collectively referred to as "Post Kirby"),and the law 
firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough including Christopher L. Burton, Sidney 
G. Baucom, James S. Lowrie (hereinafter referred to as "Jones Waldo") are endeavoring 
to prevent former client, plaintiff/appellant David Bennett, from having a day in court 
respecting claims of breaches of their Retainer Agreement contract, serious malpractice, 
and abuse of process against those lawyers. See Durkin v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d 1510 
(9th Cir. 1996); Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107; \ 64, 2001 WL 
1590475, 13 (Utah 2001). 
Until REVERSED by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 
defendant/appellees herein obtained from a lower California federal judge what she 
deemed a "permanent", "criminal" "Bar Order" (like injunction) enjoining former client, 
new attorney, David Bennett from proceeding with claims against the lawyers in Utah. 
This wrongful "bar order" disrupted David Bennett's life personally and professionally, 
until the blackening criminal sanction was finally explicitly set aside by the Ninth Circuit 
1
 This section is supplemental to a Statement of the Case and Statement of 
Additional Facts in the Brief of Appellant David D. Bennett, filed September 27, 2001. 
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appellate court, along with reversal of a $27,000 penalty that had been imposed for 
lawyers' fees. 
2. STATEMENT OF KEY FACTS 
1. On April 18, 1990, David D. Bennett and the law firm of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough signed a Retainer Agreement authorizing the representation of 
him throughout the David D. Bennett v. Gen-Probe, Inc., et al case (hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "Bennett v. Gen-Probe" or "Gen-Probe" case). R. 1101-1111 
(Fourth Amended Complaint) as well as Attachment " 3 " to the opening Brief of 
Appellant David D. Bennett f "Appellant's Brief').2 Both class action claims and various 
derivative claims were separately pleaded in the Gen-Probe case, with David Bennett at 
all times being the sole named (verifying) plaintiff bringing the state and federal 
derivative claims. See FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rules 23 and 23.1, 
respectively, and UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rules 23.1. 
2
 David Bennett was also the only class action plaintiff upon the filing of the 
Gen-Probe case in November of 1989. Other named plaintiffs, family and close friends 
of David Bennett, were later added to the case and to the Retainer Agreement at the 
behest of Jones Waldo and Post Kirby. 
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2. That Utah Retainer Agreement of April 18, 1990 provided in pertinent part as 
follows: 
6. Clients agree that the Law Firm may, at its sole discretion, 
retain associate counsel to assist in the prosecution of Clients' 
Causes of Action provided associate counsel is retained at Law 
Firm's sole expense. **** 
19. In any action brought to enforce this Retainer Agreement, 
Law Firm and Clients agree that the Third Judicial District of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, shall have jurisdiction and venue . . . . 
[(hereinafter referred to as a "Forum Selection Clause")] 
20. This Retainer Agreement shall be interpreted, applied and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
[(hereinafter referred to as a "Choice of Law Clause")] 
[Bracketed information added]. R. 1101-1111; and Attachment "3" , Appellant's Brief. 
A. Joint-Venture Agreement 
3. On October 24, 1990, the law firm of Post Kirby and Michael Kirby were 
associated in Utah by Jones Waldo pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Retainer Agreement 
with David Bennett, et al Michael Kirby and his law firm of Post Kirby actively seeks 
class action representations nationally. Attachment "4M, Appellant's Brief. 
4. Post Kirby was associated on October 24, 1990 to represent David Bennett, 
and others, under express authority of the Retainer Agreement. Attachment " 3 " , 
paragraph 6, Appellant's Brief That contingent-fee contract was subject to a Utah 
Forum Selection Clause fl[ 19) and a Utah Choice of Law Clause fl[ 20). kL Attachment 
" 3 " (Retainer Agreement), Appellant fs Brief 
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5. In an October 24, 1990 letter agreement, Post Kirby stated in pertinent part: 
My firm will have considerably greater responsibility than 
merely acting as local counsel, I have conferred with my partners 
on this matter and we are willing to undertake the joint 
representation with you of the plaintiffs in this action [Bennett v. 
Gen-Probe]. If you and your clients are in agreement, please let me 
k n o w . . . . 
Bolding emphasis and bracketed information added. Attachment "4", Appellant's Brief. 
6. On November 12, 1990, client David Bennett met in Utah with Michael Kirby 
and Post Kirby lawyers to approve Post Kirby's involvement in the Gen-Probe case. R. 
1600 (Time Records of Post Kirby) and Attachment "14" ofAppellant's Brief 
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7. David Bennett understood that Michael Kirby and his law firm's joint 
representation were subject to the Retainer Agreement. This was established in an 
October 24, 1990 letter agreement.3 R. 1055-1056 (Fourth Amend. Comp. ffif 53-54). 
3
 Post Kirby and Jones Waldo should be deemed joint venturers in law and 
partners by estoppel. See UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 48-1-13, which states: 
(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by conduct represents 
himself, or consents to another's representing him, to anyone as a partner, in 
an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he 
is liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made 
who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the actual or 
apparent partnership, and, if he has made such representation or consented 
to its being made in a public manner, he is liable to such person, whether 
the representation has or has not been made or communicated to such 
person so giving credit by, or with the knowledge of, the apparent partner 
making the representation consenting to its being made, (a) When a 
partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were an actual member of 
the partnership, (b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly 
with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or 
representation as to incur liability; otherwise, separately. 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an existing 
partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is an agent 
of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them to the same 
extent and in the same manner as through he were a partner in fact, with 
respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where all the 
members of an existing partnership consent to the representation, a 
partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint act 
or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the 
representation. 
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8. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Sections 48-1-6(1) and 48-1-10 (the Utah 
Partnership Act), respectively state: 
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its 
business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in 
the partnership name of any instrument for apparently carrying on 
in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a 
member, binds the partnership . . . . 
* * * 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the 
ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the 
authority of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any person, 
not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the 
partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so 
acting or omitting to act. 
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B. Tactics Related to the "Bar Order" 
9. On September 10,1992, named plaintiff David Bennett was granted 
permission to exclude himself from the Gen-Probe case by order of Judge Earl B. 
Gilliam. R. 1699-1711 {Final Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice "), also 
Attachment "13", Appellant's Brief; see also FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
Rule 23. The valuable derivative claims were improperly dropped by Michael Kirby from 
the Fourth Amended Complaint and never repleaded).4 Attachment "15" (A Post Kirby 
letter asserting that the derivative claims were valuable and should not be dropped), filed 
herewith. R. 1058-1059 (Fourth Amended Complaint, ffi[ 63-68). 
10. The Final Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice entered September 10, 1992 by 
Judge Gilliam ordered in relevant part: 
The members of the class listed on Exhibit 1 [David D. Bennett] 
hereto have submitted valid requests for exclusion and are not 
bound by this Judgment. 
Bolding emphasis added. Attachment "13", Appellant's Brief 
4
 On page 6, footnote 3, and page 37 of the Brief of Post Kirby Appellees, 
Michael Kirby now tries to defend that he was not hired to represent David Bennett on 
derivative claims. This assertion is not correct and is not before this Court for resolution 
at this motion-to-dismiss stage; it was never litigated below. 
7 Wednesday, January 2, 2002 12:47 pm 
11. On January 11, 1996, while an appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, 
Judge Keep imposed what she actually called "criminal" contempt and sanctions of more 
than $27,000.00 on David Bennett, saying: "The criminal bar order prohibits Bennett and 
his attorneys from initiating and maintaining any lawsuit against class counsel which in 
any way involves . . . the competency of class counsel or counsel's legal services 
[Transcript, Jan. 11, 1996, p. 18]. At this contempt and sanctions hearing on January 11, 
1996, Judge Keep erroneously asserted that her orders "are final". "They were not 
appealed. They are the law of this case and cannot be challenged today." [Transcript, 1-
11-96, p. 26]. R. 1076 (Fourth Amend. Comp. ffi[ 141-145). 
12. On June 14, 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court "AFFIRMED, as so construed" 
Judge Keep's permanent Bar Order type injunction. However, David Bennett was 
allowed to dispute the competency of the representation by class counsel. In this 
Memorandum disposition, the Ninth Circuit essentially interpreted the injunction to allow 
David Bennett to proceed with his case in Utah against his former lawyers, revising the 
order but in a contrary form. The "AFFIRMANCE" was somewhat confusing. Bennett 
v. Gen-Probe, 87 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1996). R. 1077 (Fourth Amend. Comp. Tf 147). 
13. But these protracted proceedings finally came to an end on June 19, 1997. 
On that day, the Ninth Circuit court issued a second Memorandum disposition that clearly 
REVERSED "The district court's orders finding Bennett in contempt. . . and requiring 
Bennett to amend his complaint and to pay sanctions." Bennett v. Gen-Probe, 116 F.3d 
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482 (9th Cir. (California) 1997). Attachment "5", Appellant's Brief 
14. This final adjudication read, bottom line: "The district court may not prevent 
a Utah court from litigating malpractice and breach of contract issues relating to appellee 
law firm's representation of Bennett. . . ." The Circuit Court's analysis stated: 
Bennett's Second Amended Complaint does not assert any claim on 
behalf of the class and does not purport to affect the parties to the 
underlying class action settlement. When the complaint challenges 
the adequacy of the class settlement, it does so only insofar as it 
relates to the law firm's representation of Bennett. Similarly, 
Bennett's allegations concerning the law firm's representation of 
the class relate to his claims concerning his representation. The 
district court erred in holding that any challenge to the 
adequacy of the settlement or to the law firm's representation 
of the class threatened the finality of the class action judgment 
and in finding Bennett and his counsel in contempt. 
The district court's orders finding Bennett and his counsel in 
contempt of the Bar Order and requiring Bennett to amend his 
complaint and to pay sanctions are REVERSED. 
Bolding emphasis added. IdL 
15. Judge Keep signed an Order to Release Supersedeas Bond on September 12, 
1997. The sequence of lawyer and judicial overreaching cost David Bennett more than 
three disrupted years of time out of his life, great personal and professional anguish 
(David Bennett is now himself an attorney), and more than $200,000.00 for legal fees, 
including for necessary out-of-state counsel to represent him. R. 1078 (Fourth Amend. 
Comp. 1fl[ 148-149. 
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C. Rule 59 in the Pending Case 
16. On October 25, 2000, in the first of two prior appeals to our Utah Supreme 
Court in the case at bar, Chief Justice Richard C. Howe ordered: 
Defendants'[Post Kirby's] motion to dismiss this appeal [Docket 
No. 2000-0518-SC] is granted. Plaintiffs notice of appeal, filed 
while a rule 59 motion was pending at the district court, was 
premature, and this court lacks jurisdiction. Swenson Assocs. v. 
State, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994). 
Utah Supreme Court Order. (Bolding emphasis and bracketed information added.) See 
Appellant's Brief, Attachment "10" (Order, Case No. 2000-0518-SC). 
17. In support of that motion to the High Court on October 25, 2000, Post Kirby 
submitted over 100 pages including thirteen exhibits (A through M) and lower-court 
filings from January 7, 2000 to June 23, 2000. See Utah Supreme Court case No. 
20000518-SC, Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition (July 18, 2000). See also 
Appellant's Response in Opposition to 'Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition ". 
18. On February 21, 2001, Chief Justice Richard Howe, speaking for the Court, 
addressed the second of three appeals (Docket No. 2000-0938-SC) in these terms: 
This appeal is dismissed on the court's own motion on the ground 
there has been no final judgment entered, and this court lacks 
jurisdiction. The order dismissing the law firm of Jones Waldo was 
not certified as a final judgment under rule 54(b) Utah R. Civ. P. 
Because the judgment dismissing the law firm of Post Kirby has 
never been finalized, there is no final judgment in this case. 
This appeal is dismissed without prejudice. 
Bolding emphasis added. See Appellant's Brief Attachment "11". 
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3. ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: David Bennett Timely Appealed Rulings of the District 
Court 
Plaintiff/appellant David Bennett timely appealed District Court Judge Tyrone 
Medley's rulings, an issue implicitly decided by the Supreme Court on two prior 
occasions. See supra. Supplemental Statement of Relevant Facts ("Suppl. Facts"), ffif 21 -
23. 
The Court, first on October 25, 2000 and again February 21, 2001, found that two 
prior appeals by David Bennett (Docket Nos. 2000-0518SC and 2000-0938-SC) were 
"premature" because "a rule 59 motion was pending at the district court" and since "the 
judgment dismissing the law firm of Post Kirby was never finalized, there is no final 
judgment in this case". See Appellant's Brief, Attachment "10" and Attachment "11", 
respectively. Thus, this issue has already been fully briefed incident to the Supreme 
Court's prior determinations. See Suppl. Facts, above, ^ 22, in particular; the cited briefs 
are incorporated herein by reference. 
This matter was decided by Chief Justice Richard Howe, FOR THE COURT. 
Plaintiff, supportive of his appellant position now notes further: 
1.) The Rule 59 motion entitled Reply of Plaintiff in Support of His Notice of 
Objections to a Minute Entry and "Proposed Order'\ filed February 16, 2000 (R. 1886-
1893), was not finally decided until over a year later, on February 28, 2001 in Judge 
11 Wednesday, January 2, 2002 12 47 pm 
Tyrone Medley's Order Denying Outstanding Motions. See Appellant's Brief 
Attachment "2" (Order). 
Plaintiff timely appealed on March 27, 2001. IcL, Attachment "1" (Notice of 
Appeal). The Utah Court of Appeals in DeBrv v. Fidelity. 828 P.2d 520, 522-523 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) pertinently held that: 
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within ten days of the 
entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the court's findings and 
conclusions is properly treated as a post-judgment motion under either 
Rules 52(b) or Rule 59(e). 
"[T]he the time for filing a notice of appeal was tolled" [until a decision on the motion is 
entered.] IcL 
2.) Judge Tyrone Medley's signing of the exact same order on February 11th and 
again on February 28th, 2000, did not dispose of plaintiff Bennett's then outstanding Rule 
59 motion filed February 16th, 2000. See Attachment "16": a Time Line (indicating the 
key court filings before Judge Medley from January to June 2000); see also R. 1972-1975 
(Notice by Plaintiff of Summary Document Presented at Hearing, filed October 6, 2000). 
The lower court had a responsibility to rule explicitly on the Rule 59 motion. 
Contrary to an assertion by Post Kirby defendants, plaintiff David Bennett never 
stated before Judge Medley that the February 16, 2000 document titled "Reply of 
Plaintiff in Support of His Notice of Objections to a Minute Entry and 'Proposed Order"' 
was not a Rule 59 motion. Language from that Reply merely indicates that an earlier-
filed (January 28, 2000) "Plaintiffs Notice of Objections to a Minute Entiy and Proposed 
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Order is not a Rule 59, U.R.C.P. motion." See R. 1892 (emphasis in original). In short, 
only the January 28, 2000 document arguably was not designated as a Rule 59 motion, not 
the critical February 16, 2001 document.5 
A hearing might have been held indicating that the lower court had taken all 
plaintiffs objections specifically into account before the repeat signing of the order on 
February 28th, 2000.6 The Appellate Court in Regan v. Blount 978 P.2d 1051, 1054 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999), makes it clear that when a UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 
59 type objection is made, 
[t]he mere entry of a final judgment inconsistent with but silent 
regarding a post trial pre-judgment motion does not dispose of the 
motion by necessary implication unless the surrounding 
circumstances indicate that the trial court considered and rejected 
the motion. 
5
 Whether a party specifically intended to file a Rule 59 motion is not dispositive 
of whether a Rule 59 motion was filed. See e.g. Debry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance 
Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah 1999). Appellee/defendant clearly argued that it should 
be construed as a Rule 59 motion. (R. 1880). The trial court never explicitly ruled on that 
issue. 
6
 While not addressed by Utah case law, fairness would dictate that the "necessary 
implication" be measured at the time the judgment was entered so a party would have 
reasonable notice of the need to appeal. Consequently, statements by the Honorable 
Tyrone Medley made eight months after entry of the judgment that he considered and 
ruled on the Rule 59 objections should not deny Appellant David Bennett his right to 
appeal. The rules of civil procedure should not be interpreted to create traps to deny 
parties their right to appeal. The Tenth Circuit changed its procedure for FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 54(b) certification precisely because parties were being 
denied their right to appeal. Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co.. 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 
1988). The dissent in Swenson Associates Architects, P.C. v. State Division of Facilities 
Construction correctly was concerned about such technicality traps. 889 P.2d 415, 418 
(Utah 1994) (Howe, J. and Stewart C.J. dissenting). 
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3.) Appellee-defendants incorrectly rely on Morgan v. Morgan for a contention 
that Judge Tyrone Medley's signing of the February 11th and 28th, 2000 Orders can be 
construed as disposing of the Rule 59 motion. 875 P.2d 563, 564 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The Morgan case did not even involve Rule 59 objections - - only UTAH RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, Rule 4-504(2) - - which apparently can be disposed of 
implicitly by merely signing a post-dated order. 
4.) Finally, even though the point is moot, the Kirby defendants failed to move the 
lower court to consider the elements required, so as to be able to certify the district court's 
decision under UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 54. No evidence was presented 
and no hearing was held on any Rule 54 matters in the lower court. Post Kirby merely 
labeled proposed orders signed February 11th and 28th, 2001 as "Rule 54(b) Judgments" 
and unfairly included in the orders the following unsupported language: "The court 
directs entry of this Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure". That language was timely challenged by plaintiff. R. 1886-1893, 
particularly R. 1887 (Reply of Plaintiff in Support of His Notice of Objections to a Minute 
Entry and Proposed Order, filed February 16, 2000, p. 2). 
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Plaintiff David Bennett was denied due process regarding this supposed Rule 54(b) 
aspect of the orders; it was never properly raised as an issue in the lower court. Plaintiff 
did not even receive notice of the signed orders until May 10, 2000 by virtue of Post 
Kirby's Notice of Entry of Judgment for both the February 11 and February 28th, 2000 
Orders. R. 1898-1903.7 
In keeping with fairness, the , Rule 54(b) "conclusion" by the lower court should 
be deemed null and void. No appeal could properly be ripe prior to decision on the Jones 
Waldo aspects of the case - - which did not take place until February 28, 2001. See 
Appellant }s Brief Attachment u2". Notice of Appeal in the case at bar was timely filed 
March 27, 2001.8 Id, Attachment " 1 " . 
7
 Under case law, if a Rule 54 certification is inserted into a proposed order 
without argument, a party should object. (Arimizu v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co. Inc., 679 
P.2d 627, 633 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1984). David Bennett did so object and preserved the due 
process argument. R. 1859-1874 {Notice of Plaintiffs Objections to a Minute Entry and 
Proposed Order, filed January 28, 2000). 
8
 On page 26, footnote 13 of the Brief of Post Kirby Appellees, it was contended 
that plaintiff David Bennett somehow can only raise issues in this appeal on his "May 
2000 motion" - - pursuant to UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 60. However, this 
High Court should not concern itself with a Rule 60 analysis unless it is ultimately 
determined that plaintiff Bennett did not timely file a Rule 59, U.R.Civ.P. In Van Skiver 
v. United States, the 10th Circuit Court stated: "In this case, plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider was not served within ten days of the district court's judgment. Therefore, the 
motion must be construed as one pursuant to Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs' appeal from the 
denial of the motion raises for review only the district courts order of denial and not the 
underlying judgment itself. 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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POINT 2: Plaintiff David Bennett Pleaded Personal Jurisdiction 
under Utah Law for Each Claim Against Defendant Lawyers. 
A. Claims Related to Legal Malpractice 
The breach of contract and legal malpractice claims alleged by plaintiff/appellant 
David Bennett in his Fourth Amended Complaint assert facts sufficient to make a prima 
facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Post Kirby. 
As cited in Appellant's Brief, the Supreme Court in Anderson v. American Soc V 
of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah 1990), ruled that a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute merely requires that a complaint allege 
injuries to a plaintiff sustained in Utah caused by an out-of-state defendant. See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 44. 
The Utah Supreme Court in SH MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Superabrasives Corp., 969 
P.2d 430, 433 stated: 
As we held in Synergetics, the formation of a contract within the 
state involving a state resident qualifies as a transaction of business 
for purposes of the long-arm statute. 
The case at bar involved "the formation of a contract within the state involving a 
state resident", a contract between the law firm of Jones Waldo and Post Kirby. 
Plaintiff/appellant David Bennett was a third party beneficiary of that contract. 
Attachment "4*' and Attachment "14", Appellant's Brief (Utah joint- venture partnership) 
Mr Bennett suffered damages as a result Post Kirby's breach of that contract R 1078-1099 
1 6 Wednesday, January 2, 2002 12 47 pm 
As a joint venture partner, Post Kirby is jointly liable for the malpractice of Jones 
Waldo. See Appellant's Brief, Attachment "12" and supra, Suppl. Facts, fflf 3 - 8. The 
creation of that Utah joint venture with Jones Waldo and Post Kirby, subject to the Foreign 
Selection (Utah state court) and Choice of Law (Utah law) Clauses of the Retainer 
Agreement, alone should be sufficient to satisfy the prima facie jurisdictional requirements 
of due process and the Utah long-arm statute. Id, fflf 1 - 2. 
The United States Supreme Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 475, n.18 (1985) (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.. 355 U.S. 220, 223 
(1957)) stated: "So long at it creates a 'substantial connection with the forum, even a 
single act can support jurisdiction'". The Utah Court of Appeals in Franklin Covey 
Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, ( Utah Ct. App.2000) found that even just one voluntary 
business trip to Utah could establish jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute. Our 
Utah legislature 
explicitly stated that the statute "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction 
over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution". 
2 P.3d 451, 454 - 455 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)(citing UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-
27-22).9 
9
 A case relied on by defendant Kirby, Far West Capital Inc. (10th Cir. (Utah) 
1995) is easily disquishable because it involves a business tort that did not involve any 
action directed at the forum. 46 F.3d 1079-80. In contrast in the case at bar, the actions of 
defendants were directed at a Utah court. 
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Even apart from the joint venture agreement itself, Post Kirby satisfied minimum 
contacts in Utah under due process concepts by acts performed withm the state In the 
Brief of Post Kirby, p 6, defendant/appellees outline four categories of visits to Utah 
Each category involved acts of legal malpractice 
(1) "Three visits to Utah to review documents and work on the Fourth Amended 
Complaint" resultmg in Michael Kirby dropping the valuable state and federal derivative 
claims without consideration or discussion with clients R 1057-1058 
(2) "Three visits to Utah for depositions and related witness preparation" during 
which Mr Kirby and Jones Waldo lawyers pressured client David Bennett in a way 
tending to suborn perjury during his deposition, Michael Kirby "defended" David 
Bennett's deposition in Utah R 147fl[l), R 1093 fl[n) 
(3) "Three visits to Utah regarding settlement" of the Gen-Probe case resulted in 
pressuring David Bennett and other clients to settle the case for pennies on the dollar, pit 
client plaintiffs agamst each other, and change the definition of the settlement class to 
exclude all the named plaintiffs including David Bennett from the settlement without 
telling the Court or the clients R 1059-1070 
(4)"Wntten correspondence and interstate telephone calls between Post Kirby and 
Jones Waldo" gave rise to the joint-venture agreement R 1043-1138 
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B. Claims Related to the "Bar Order" 
Post Kirby caused an improper injunction to be issued and sent into Utah which 
inhibited David Bennett from exercising his right to seek redress before a Utah judge and 
jury. The intentional actions arising during the Bar Order tactics of Post Kirby underpin 
both breach of contract and tortious malpractice claims as asserted in his Fourth Amended 
Complaint. R. 1043-1138; see also Appellant's Brief Attachment "12". Claims stated 
by David Bennett in his Fourth Amended Complaint allege facts sufficient to make a 
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over Post Kirby. 
In the underlying case, the procurement and ultimately REVERSED Bar Order 
against David Bennett constituted a thinly veiled attempt to shield Post Kirby and Jones 
Waldo from being subjected to claims by David Bennett in and under Utah law, contrary 
to the Retainer Agreement. 
Not only was the Bar Order actionably overly broad, but the California federal court 
and magistrate who issued it lacked jurisdiction to do so. See Suppl. Facts, 1fl[ 9 - 14. Our 
Supreme Court ruled in Mountain States v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 
(Utah 1984): 
If, however, it is found that the injunction was wrongfully issued, the 
enjoined party has an action for costs and damages incurred as a result of the 
wrongfully issued injunction. 
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David Bennett was delayed years of time personally and professionally and 
damaged over $200,000 in out-of-pocket costs defending against the improper enjoinder 
and wrongful contempt and sanctions caused him. Id. 
In Starways, Inc. v. Curry, causing a defamatory facsimile to be sent into Utah 
was held to be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. 980 P.2d 204, 
206-08, ffif 7-12(Utah 1999) (emphasis added). The Utah court in Rocky Mountain 
Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d 1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), found that paying for 
services with a bad check was sufficient contact with the forum. In Neways, Inc. v. 
McCausland, telephone contacts which solicited business were found sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction under the prima facie standard. 950 P.2d 420, 424. (Utah 
1997). 
All three cases, Starways, Rocky Mountain, and Neways, reflect the policy of the 
Utah long-arm statute that Utah courts are to extend their jurisdiction 'to the fullest 
extent allowed by due process of law'. Trillium USA, Inc. v Board of County 
Commissioners of Broward County, Florida, 2001 WL 1557529, *4, ^ 20 ( Utah 
December 7, 2001)(quoting Starwavs, 980 P.2d at 204, ^ 7.)10 
10
 In Trillium, a contract performed in Florida was evidently found to support 
personal jurisdiction in Utah. Trillium USA, Inc. v Board of. 2001 WL 1557529, *4, H 20 
( Utah December 7, 2001). 
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POINT 3: Plaintiff/Appellant David Bennett is Not Subject to 
Collateral Estoppel by a California Federal Court 
As an opt-out from the class action case he initiated, Bennett v. Gen-Probe, David 
Bennett became no longer subject to any collateral estoppel effect of judgments issued 
from the California Federal District Court in the case. 
On June 19, 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that David 
Bennett's Utah complaint did not "threaten the finality of the class action judgment" in 
Gen-Probe. See Suppl. Facts, 1f 13. (R. 1743-1746). The federal district court 
judgment in Gen-Probe or the later separate Bar Order could not properly be used to 
collaterally estop David Bennett's causes of action in Utah. 
"[T]he parties must have had 'a full and fair opportunity to litigate'": Durkin v. 
Shea & Gould. 92 F.3d 1510, 1515 (9th Cir.1996), quoting from Montana v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). In the Gen-Probe case, no legal malpractice claims 
were asserted against parties or their lawyers. 
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"If there is any doubt. . . collateral estoppel will not be applied.5" Durkin, 92 
F.3d at 1515.11 The Ninth Circuit Court held that the issue of whether a settlement was 
"fair and adequate" for the purposes of Rule 23.1 was not the same issue as whether class 
counsel acted without negligence in the representation of its client: 
the fact that a party received a settlement that was 'fair and equitable5 
does not mean necessarily that the party's attorney was competent or 
that the party would not have received a more favorable settlement 
had the party's incompetent attorney been more competent. 
Durkin, 92 F.3d at 1516. A court-approved settlement does not immunize participating 
attorneys from subsequent malpractice actions: 
To hold otherwise would be to rule that where an attorney's negligence has 
caused a court to make erroneous adjudication of an issue, the fact that the 
court has made that adjudication absolves the attorney of all accountability 
and responsibility for his negligence. 
Id., at 1518. 
11
 This Court should not afford the district court final judgment (R. 1699-1711) 
more preclusive effect than would be afforded by the Ninth Circuit Court. Ironically, it is 
Post Kirby that should be collaterally estopped from asserting the same against David 
Bennett, a position agreed with in the conclusion of the June 19, 1997 Memorandum 
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court. Attachment "5", Appellant's Brief 
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POINT 4: Contrary to Assertions of Opposing Counsel, California Law 
Probably Would Preclude David Bennett From Bringing a Malpractice 
Action In California Against Post Kirby. 
Contrary to the assertion by opposing counsel for Post Kirby, Bennett likely would 
be unable to obtain "complete and efficient relief against Post Kirby in California. Brief 
of Post Kirby Appellees, p. 46. 
In Gordon v. Law Offices of Aguirre & Meyer, a California court applied a one 
year statute of limitations (not found in Utah) and refused to apply equitable tolling to an 
action that was first filed in Arizona without the requisite personal jurisdiction. 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 119, 123-24 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1999). The California court stated: 
[accordingly, we conclude the doctrine of equitable tolling is 
inapplicable here, notwithstanding any lack of prejudice to Aguirre 
& Meyer occasioned by plaintiffs' filing of the lawsuit shortly after 
the Arizona case was dismissed. 
83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124. 
Consequently, SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 436 
(Utah 1998) cited by defendant/appellees actually supports the finding of jurisdiction. In 
that case the Court stated that, "[b]alanced against the inconvenience to the defendants is 
the express interest the state has in ensuring protection to its residents from the acts of 
nonresidents." Id. (Quoting Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1111 
(Utah 1985). In the case at bar, while defendant Kirby would only suffer a marginal 
inconvenience of having to litigate in Utah, David Bennett might well be denied any 
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remedy for malpractice and for an attack on his first amendment right to petition a court 
for redress of his injuries. 
4. PRAYER 
Appellant/plaintiff David Bennett prays for a day in court on his claims before a 
Utah judge and jury. 
5. ORIGINAL SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL OF RECORD 
DATED this 2 v J day of January, 2002. 
Q /yuUr-^ 
Daniel G. Moquin 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
Franklin Reed Bennett 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff: David D. Bennett, 
1189 South 2100 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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6. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Re: David D. Bennett v. The Law Firm of Jones. Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough. et al., 
Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 2001-0296-SC 
I hereby certify that on this 2-K<& day of January, 2002,1 caused to be sent, 
through the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies 
of the 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT DAVID D. 
BENNETT 
TO THE BRIEF OF 
POST KIRBY APPELLEES 
addressed to each of the following: 
R. Brent Stephens 
Maralyn M. Reger 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James S. Jardine 
Rick B. Hoggard 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
(801)532-1500 
79 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
JJohn Nicholas Call 
Lead Legal Assistant 
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ADDENDUM 
The attachments of plaintiff/appellant's briefs are sequentially numbered. Thus, 
Attachments 1-14 are contained in the Brief of Appellant David D. Bennett Attachments 
15-16 are appended to this Reply Brief of Appellant David D. Bennett to the Brief of Post 
Kirby Appellees. 
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NATALIE C VCNCZtA 
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SAN DIEGO, CA D2IOI-8I03 
TELEPHONE (CI©) 231-6006 
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December 20, 1990 
OICKHAN A. acMinogiAN 
JAM EG O. PORTWAN 
C- KCNMatTH PURVIAWCC 
j e r r f i c v A, MAICC 
JAMtS R. LANCC 
•TCVEN W. EANCHCC 
O. PATRICK CONNOR* III 
THKRCSA M. »NCHL 
JCFPRCY P. LCNORUM 
CMMCfiT fc. WIDCMAN 
Timothy C« Houpt, Esq* 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main street, suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Bennett v« Bologna 
Dear Tim: 
Enclosed is a copy of the Stipulated Order which has now 
been signed by all counsel. Robin Werner called me on 
Wednesday and indicated that they were not inclined to sign 
the Order unless we stipulated to (1) dismiss the derivative 
claimsf and (2) dismiss the Utah pendent law claims. I rold 
her that I would not commit to doing so under any 
circumstances* I also told her that if they did not sign 
the Stipulated Order, I would make the ex parte application 
to Judge Gilliam. After she and her cohorts deliberated for 
a day, the Stipulated Order was signed, as you can see. 
My plans are to arrive in Park City on December 27 and I 
will be there through January 5# I would like to spend a 
full day or two during that period meeting with you. Please 
check your schedules and let me know what days would be best 
to meet with you. 
Best regards, 
Out 
Michael L. Kirby 
of 
POST KIRBY NOONAN & SWEAT 
MLK342:dav 
Enclosure 
Tab,' 
ATTACHMENT "16" 
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TIME LINE 
Bennett v. Jones Waldo, et al and Post Kirby, et al. Case No. 94-0908220 
Hearing held October 2, 2000 before Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Jan, 7 - Minute Entry (with mailing certificate) 
'.MI. "28 - Plaintiff files Objections to Minute Entry and "Proposed Order". 
, i>. S Defendants file Response to PlaintifTs Objections to Minute Entry and "Proposed Order" (attached and first signed on Feb. 11). 
v\\ " - Judgment Entered (without mailing certificate) 
cb. 16 - Plaintiff files Reply to Defendants' Response to PlaintifTs Objection of Minute Entry and "Proposed Order". 
[This Reply must be deemed a Rule 59 motion under DeBry v. Cascade, 828 P.2d 520 (Utah App. 1992) and "thus the time for 
filing a notice of appeal was tolled" until a decision on that motion is entered. Reeves v. Steinfeldt. 915 P,2d 1073, 1077 (Utah 
App. 1996) and Regan v. Blount 978 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah App. 1999)] 
Feb. 17 - Defendants file Notice to Submit for Signature with same earlier "Proposed Order" attached (which was later signed again on 
Feb. 28). 
Feb. 28 - Judgment Entered (without mailing certificate) 
[Controlling authority states: "The mere entry of a final judgment inconsistent with but silent regarding a post-trial pre-judgment 
motion does not dispose of the motion by necessary implication unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that the trial court 
considered and rejected the motion".... "The court did not hold a hearing on the motion, and the amended order and judgment, 
prepared by the appellee was silent regarding the motion. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court considered or was 
even aware of the motion before it signed the amended order and judgment, or supports the assumption that the amended order 
and judgment disposed of the motion by necessary implication. Thus the motion suspends the finality of the judgment until disposed 
of by order of the trial court and renders the notice of appeal ineffective." Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d at 1054] 
May 10 - Defendants file Notice of Entry of both the Feb. 11 and Feb. 28 judgments. [Day 89 (after Feb. 11 Judgment entered)] 
May 26 - Plaintiff files Rule 60 Motion re Feb. 28th judgment and motion to decide Rule 59 Motion. 
June 9 - Plaintiff files Notice of Appeal. [Day 29 (after notice of entry of judgment)] 
